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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The jury unanimously found that plaintiff/appellant 
James Sanders (plaintiff or Sanders) did not prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that his injuries, if any, were prox-
imately caused by the automobile accident between him and 
defendant/respondant, Kristin Ahlstrom (defendant or Ahlstrom). 
The trial court entered judgment on the jury's special verdict 
and denied plaintiff's motion for new trial. The issue is 
whether or not the jury verdict should be set aside and whether 
or not the judgment of the trial court should be vacated and the 
case remanded. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This personal injury action arose from an automobile 
accident. The case was tried by jury before the Honorable 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge in the Third Judicial District Court. 
The jury found that defendant was negligent and that her negli-
gence caused the accident. However, the jury unanimously 
answered interrogatory 3 on the Special Verdict as follows: 
3. If you answered questions 1 and 2 
"Yes11, then answer this question: Did 
James Lee Sanders prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that his injuries, if any, 
were proximately caused by the accident in 
question? 
ANSWER: No. 
A copy of the signed special verdict is appended hereto as 
Appendix 1. 
The trial court entered judgment on the special verdict 
-1-
in favor of defendant and against plaintiff, no cause of action. 
(Appendix 2 herein) Plaintiff made a motion for new trial which 
was briefed, argued and then denied by the court. (Appendix 3 
herein) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because plaintiff's Statement of Facts is incomplete, 
misleading, conclusionary and in many instances without proper 
support in the record, it is necessary for defendant to discuss 
in some detail the facts of this case. 
On September 25, 1982, plaintiff was driving an automo-
bile in which several other members of his family were 
passengers. (R. 351) At the base of a hill he stopped for a 
red light. (R. 25) His automobile was last in line behind 
several other cars. (R. 25) The roads were very wet and very 
slick. (R. 648, 649) 
Shortly after plaintiff stopped, defendant driving a car 
in which her four children were passengers crested the hill, saw 
the red light and line of cars behind it and applied her brakes. 
(R. 648) Defendant's car slid on the wet roads, did not slow as 
quickly as it would have under normal conditions, and collided 
with the rear of plaintiff's vehicle. (R. 649) Plaintiff 
testified that he was stopped within a car length of the car in 
front of him and that the impact knocked his car forward two or 
three feet. (R. 429, 513) The impact did not push plaintiff's 
car into the car in front of it. 
Damage to plaintiff and defendant's vehicles was minor 
as shown by the photographs taken of the vehicles shortly after 
the collision. (Exhibits 2-P, 30-D) The investigating officer 
estimated the impact speed at 15 miles per hour. (R. 625) David 
Lord, an accident reconstructionist called by plaintiff, agreed 
with the investigating officer's assessment of impact speed. (R. 
387) However, Mr. Lord admitted that assuming an impact of 15 
miles an hour and further assuming that plaintiff's foot remained 
firmly on the brake after impact, plaintiff's car would have been 
pushed forward a full 18 feet from the point of impact until it 
came to rest. (R. 415, 416) 
After the accident while plaintiff's son directed traf-
fic, defendant had some conversations at the scene of the acci-
dent which she related as follows: 
A. Right after the accident, I quickly 
made sure all of my children wre okay and 
they all were. I got out of my car. I 
went down and went to the passenger side 
of Mr. Sanders car to ask them if they 
were all right. The baby was crying a lot 
and I was concerned maybe he was hurt and 
I asked the mother several times. I said, 
"Is the baby okay?" And she said, "Yes, 
he is fine. It just scared him." I asked 
her that several times. She seemed to 
indicate everybody was all right. 
Q. After that occurred, did you have 
any conversations with Mr. Sanders? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Will you relate those conversations, 
please? 
A. He told me that he thought he might 
have a whiplash because he had had one 
once before. (R. 651, 652) 
-V 
At the scene of the accident, Todd Ahlstrom, defendant's 
oldest son, heard his mother state that plaintiff told her that 
he (plaintiff) had experienced a prior whiplash. (R. 725) A few 
minutes after the accident, defendant drove to her mother's house 
where she related the conversation she had with plaintiff at the 
scene when plaintiff admitted he had experienced a prior 
whiplash. (R. 653) The investigating officer, Jerry Peterson, 
had a memory of a statement being made by someone at the inter-
section in question following an accident to the effect, "I had a 
prior whiplash." (R. 626, 627) 
Contrary to the above testimony, plaintiff denied 
telling defendant at the scene that he had experienced a prior 
whiplash. (R. 30) However, he admitted that he was involved in 
two rearend collisions before September 25, 1982, but he failed 
to give much detail regarding these accidents. He said he could 
not recall exactly when the accidents occurred except that both 
of them occurred during the summer of 1982, nor could he recall 
who the involved parties were. (R. 510) 
Regarding the rearend accident immediately preceding the 
September 25, 1982 accident between Sanders and Ahlstrom, Sanders 
admitted that after this prior accident occurred, his neck was 
sore, stiff and hurt for two, three or four days. (R. 435, 436) 
Plaintiff was involved in a subsequent accident in July 
of 1983, when a car which was speeding, smashed into the side of 
a Fiat vehicle in which plaintiff was riding as a passenger. (R. 
490-492) Dr. Goka testified plaintiff was injured in this acci-
dent. (R. 587, 592, 597) When pressed on cross-examination, 
plaintiff admitted he was injured "to a degree." (R. 491) 
Plaintiff's wife admitted he "was hurting." (R. 619) 
After the September 25, 1982 accident was investigated 
by Officer Peterson, plaintiff and his family continued on with 
their family outing. They went to the Stuffed Noodle Restaurant, 
had lunch together and then returned home. (R. 485) 
Plaintiff did not see a doctor immediately. Plaintiff 
testified that his first medical treatment was in the form of 
therapy from Burt Kidman who plaintiff identified as a chiroprac-
tor, osteopath and masseuse. (R. 485) Plaintiff testified that 
he had seen Mr. Kidman repeatedly in the past for back problems 
including kinks in his back and neck. (R. 485, 486) According 
to plaintiff, after his initial visit with Mr. Kidman on 
September 27, 1985, he saw Kidman several times thereafter. 
However, plaintiff did not call Mr. Kidman to testify nor did he 
introduce as exhibits any records which may have been maintained 
by Kidman. 
Plaintiff testified that after undergoing massage treat-
ments at the hands of Burt Kidman, he was seen by his brother-in-
law, Dr. Evans, then a radiologist, a Dr. Winters, who took some 
x-rays and finally Dr. Rich, a neurologist. (R. 442) Plaintiff 
chose not to call Dr. Evans, Dr. Winters and Dr. Rich and chose 
not to introduce any of their medical records. However, Dr. 
Barbuto and Dr. Spencer reviewed records from these doctors which 
assisted them in formulating their opinion that plaintiff was not 
injured. (R. 208-210, 756, 767-768) The x-rays shows some 
arthritic changes to the spine but were otherwise normal. (R. 
752, 753) The myelogram showed no trauma induced abnormalities. 
(R. 753) 
On a referral from Dr. Rich, plaintiff saw Dr. John 
Barbuto, a Board certified neurologist. (R. 702-704) Plaintiff 
saw Dr. Barbuto on February 23, 1983, and then again on March 8, 
1983 (R. 662), less than five months after the accident with 
defendant occurred and certainly not more than six months as 
plaintiff in his brief claims. 
Dr. Barbuto conducted a neurological examination of 
plaintiff which proved essentially normal. (R. 672) Dr. Barbuto 
elaborated regarding his findings by stating: 
A. Let's look at the data that I had. 
At that point, I didn't really have any 
significant data for a serious injury. 
His exam looked fine. Some number of 
things tend to conclude that. Initially, 
he didn't even go to a doctor, he went to 
a masseuse. If he was majorly injured, 
that probably would not have been his 
course. So, I didn't have any good data 
to suggest that there was a major injury 
going on initially. 
So, I think with regard to deciding if 
the injury has healed, we have to first 
establish if there was indeed a major 
injury. If we say, "minor forms of 
injury", which the doctor can't document, 
many people go out and spring fingers or 
get something or other that the doctor 
can't see, that happens but those things 
tend to be shortlived. Could that have 
been there and could that have healed, the 
answer is probably yes. Is it possible? 
It is a minor thing happening? It is 
always possible. I would presume that 
would have healed. As I said, I saw no 
evidence of a serious process and the 
course of things did not suggest that that 
reflected an underlying serious process 
which would be expected to be ongoing. 
Q. Well, so what, in your opinion, 
could account for this prolonged symptoms 
that Mr. Sanders was complaining? 
A. One of the things I see a lot now 
days is a very, very complicated process 
which is called "stress physiology". It 
is a very real process. 
Dr. Barbuto then explained "stress physiology" to the jury and 
related it to Sanders' situation: 
A. Let's start off with a couple of 
simple examples. Everybody I think is 
used to thinking in terms of a person gets 
under stress and they get an ulcer. 
Stress causes some change and a person get 
a hole in their stomach, nobody is 
questioning that there is something there. 
If somebody says they have pain in there, 
no one questions that they have pain. 
High blood pressure, it is very well writ-
ten up in Ladies' Home Journal and 
everything else about stress causing high 
blood pressure and I am sure also people 
have read about what is called the "Type A 
Personality." The real go-getter, often 
executives or aggressive kinds of people 
who get higher incidents of heart attacks. 
So what happens if there is now this 
increasing understanding that stress does 
things to our bodies. 
-k -k -k 
All right, well, I see people who now 
get symptoms on that basis where the major 
cause of their symptoms, over the long 
haul, is that kind of process. We see a 
lot of people with tension headaches. I 
will tell you more about that later. Lots 
of people without an abnormal pain problem 
and back pain problems. Certainly the 
ulcer or the colitis, the palpatations or 
shortness of breath, excessive tiredness, 
wide movement strain or difficulty 
sleeping, ringing in the ears or blurry 
vision. 
Q. Doctor, are those symptoms, as you 
described them, are they in your 
experience caused by the stress? 
A. Yeah, that is what we see. That is 
what the patient tells us. 
• * * 
Q. What I want to know, doctor, insofar 
-- letfs bring it back to Mr. Sanders. 
Now, is one thing then that you have 
testified that could account for his --
this prolonged symptom is some sort of 
stress or anxiety? 
A. Yes, physiology would easily account 
for the kind of symptoms he has and also 
explain a number of things about how the 
symptoms have progressed. 
Q. Would things like marital problems, 
could that create that kind or problem? 
A. Stress is different things for dif-
ferent people. It can be jobs or marital 
or some other very personal issue. A lot 
of times, we don't know because people 
wonft tell us. A lot of times we don't 
know. 
Q. Financial difficulty? 
A. Sure. 
Q. Wife being laid off work? 
A. All kinds of things. there are 
other possibilities. (R. 672-675) 
Dr. Barbuto stated clearly that Sanders1 perceived symp-
toms were likely a result of secondary gain and stresses. He 
reiterated that stresses without any trauma whatsoever could 
e a s i l y cause the kind of symptoms of which p l a i n t i f f complained. 
(R. 684, 690) 
Dr. Barbuto summarized his opinions by stating: 
Q. (By Mr. Burton) Doctor Barbuto, 
focusing in on Mr. Sanders, do you have an 
opinion, with a reasonable degree of medi-
cal certainty, whether or not the accident 
that Mr. Sanders was involved in on 
September 25, 1982 was the cause of the 
symptoms that he related to you when you 
saw him in February and March of !83. 
A. I think the answer is no. I don't 
think that the data fits very well with 
that conclusion. It fits very well with 
an alternative conclusion which is stress 
physiology, which I see all the time. 
Q. Do you have an opinion whether the 
accident caused stress and anxiety in Mr. 
Sanders and whether that anxiety continued 
and that was sufficient to cause the symp-
toms of which he complained in February 
and March of '83? 
A. Again, I can give you a long 
discussion and point out why I would say 
what I am going to say. The answer is, 
no, I don't think that fits with the data. 
(R. 686, 687) 
Dr. Barbuto then explained why he reached the conclusions which 
he did: 
A. First of all, if we ask the 
question, and this is a good question, 
does an accident produce the stress that 
then produces the personfs symptoms, 
reasonable question, if that is the case 
there are certain things we would expect 
to see. We would expect to see that, for 
instance, the stress would be present as a 
manifestation of the accident, would not 
be dependent on such things as the social 
circumstances of the accident, that is to 
say, who is at fault. It would have to be 
a phenomenon from the trauma itself. As I 
pointed out, that isn't what we observed. 
It doesn't appear that one can argue that 
stress would be a derivative of the mecha-
nics of the accident and that would 
account for the person's symptoms. 
Secondly, if we assume or again a reason-
able assumption, that the worse the acci-
dent, the more the stress. Somebody comes 
into an emergency room with broken bones 
going every different direction and a rup-
tured liver, we have to assume that person 
is under terrible stress, yet they don't 
get chronic pain syndrome. When we have 
people who have major trauma, broken bones 
going very way, we don't see this. . . 
The other function that would be 
expected is that if it was purely related 
to the trauma of the accident, that per-
son's symptoms would clearly correspond to 
the accident and would take a certain pat-
tern. And they often don't. We often use 
these kinds of things coming on weeks or 
months later, as opposed to coming on 
immediately or we see people continue to 
worsen rather than getting better. Many 
other kinds of things that just don't fit 
very well with the conclusion that, yes, 
they have an accident and that generates 
the stress and that generates the symp-
toms. There is a lot of data that sup-
ports that, and I can go on and on, but 
anyway there are a lot of other things 
that we see that refute that conclusion. 
(R. 687-689) 
Further elaborating on the role of stress and tension 
producing the kind of symptoms of which plaintiff complained, 
Barbuto testif ied: 
Q. Doctor, the kinds of symptoms con-
cerning which Mr. Sanders complains, 
headaches, tinnitis or ringing in the ear, 
neck pain and shoulder pain, do you see 
those kinds of symptoms more frequently as 
a result of stress and tension than, say, 
other kinds of symptoms? 
A. I see at least one or two new 
patients a day with tension headache 
syndrome. They have these same kinds of 
things. They get a symptom complex. They 
may get one or more of the symptoms, 
headache, back pain, arm numbness, leg 
numbness, ringing in the ear, vision 
blurry, tiredness, difficulty sleeping, 
passing out spells. I see that com-
bination in some form every day. (R. 690, 
691) 
The doctor summarized by stating he saw no evidence that Sanders 
was injured or that his perceived symptoms were caused by the 
accident (R. 672-673, 689) 
Plaintiff built his case around a "fibrositis11 diagno-
sis. However, plaintiff's own treating physician, Dr. Goka, 
testified that fibrositis is a controversial diagnosis and many 
doctors do not believe it exists at all. (R. 558) Dr. Barbuto 
confirmed Dr. Goka on this point. Insofar as the plaintiff's 
fibrositis claim is concerned, Dr. Barbuto testified: 
Q. Now, doctor, Dr. Goka has been here 
earlier and you have reviewed his records 
as well. He has testified as diagnosing 
Mr. Sanders and he said it is his opinion 
he has fibrositis. Are you familiar with 
that diagnosis? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you tell us, is that a contro-
versial kind of diagnosis? 
A. It is a very controversial symptom. 
First of all, because lots of people don't 
believe it can exist. Some do believe it 
exists. It is usually invoked in the same 
kind of patient we see stress physiology. 
Very often in these kinds of accidents and 
tension headaches. If you look at the 
description, what is called fibrositis, it 
is often the same as called tension 
headaches, low back pain. If you look at 
the medical literature, and I have a 
number of examples here, they refer to it 
as a nebulous thing. People are not 
really sure what it is. It doesn't exist 
when they look at demographics, which are 
studies of population dynamics, . . . . 
(R. 691) 
Dr. Barbuto then read about fibrositis from Beeson and McDermic, 
a well-accepted, authoritative, two volume medical textbook: 
A. "The term 'fibrositis1 has been 
applied to a poorly defined symptom 
complex which is characterized by pain and 
stiffness in various areas. Most com-
monly, the neck, shoulder girdle and the 
posterior aspect of the trunk, the back, 
the low back . . . the soft tissue will be 
muscles and the tendons and things that 
hold them all together. Physical signs 
. . . many laboratory and roentgen ray 
studies are negative. The term fibrositis 
is based on vague hypothesis and common 
usage rather than on anatomic abnor-
malities . A localized area of tenderness 
common in the peripheral area medial to 
the scapula, have been termed 'trigger 
points.1 The syndrome usually begins in 
middle years of life because the majority 
of patients appear tense and anxious, have 
few recognizable objectable basis for 
their symptoms. The symptom is often con-
sidered psychogenic, which means pain and 
stiffness can be manifestations of a 
majority of (reading very rapidly) . . . 
an exclusion of more defined illnesses. 
[Emphasis added] 
That is the kind of thing people write 
about fibrositis. (R. 691, 693) 
Dr. Barbuto then stated he had a computer service called 
Medline. (R. 693) Using Medline he excerpted and abstracted all 
articles written on fibrositis from 1979 on, and he brought a 
thick computer printout with him to court. (R. 694) Dr. Barbuto 
summarized the literature as follows: 
A. Basically, everything everybody sort 
of says is, "Well, I don't see anything. 
Okay, maybe there is something there but 
whatever it is, it's beginning, it is not 
a big deal." People try injections or 
just some known steroid medication. Every 
conclusion basically seems to be: Okay, 
find something. There is something there 
because people complain of something but 
whatever it seems to be is not enough to 
produce abnormalities of the tests and not 
enough to be serious. And basically most 
of the articles come out with their 
conclusions being reassuring this isn't 
serious and put them on some local 
anesthetics which are the shots and some 
muscle relaxants or some tranquilizers and 
most of the articles reflect the use of 
amitriphyline which is a drug we use very 
commonly for treating tension headaches. 
Many of the articles refer to stress and 
anxiety. Many of these articles refer to 
the role of anxiety and stress processes 
and this kind of thing. (R. 695) 
Dr. Barbuto did not believe that any of Sanders' p 
ceived symptoms were as a result of the automobile accident 
September, 1982, including Sanders' position that he was a 
of fibrositis. Dr. Barbuto testified: 
Q. Now, can fibrositis be caused simply 
by old age and stress incident to old age 
according to the literature? 
A. Since people argue as to what it is 
and if it even is, it becomes harder still 
to argue what causes it. As I said, many 
people refer to it as psychiatric illness 
or a psychology process where it is stress 
related. Many of the articles refer to 
high correlation with that. , , . 
Q. If we assume, hypothetically, that 
Mr. Sanders has what we have difficulty 
defining as fibrositis, do you have an 
opinion as to whether or not the accident 
would be a cause of that kind of mani-
festation later on? 
A. Well, yeah, I have some opinions, I 
think, first of all, when we are talking 
about fibrositis, we are talking about 
this nebulous thing. Secondly, we observe 
again that people with not compensated 
accidents or the other person in those 
kinds of accidents, doesnft get fibrosi-
tis. So, that suggests that it is not 
something that is a derivative of the 
accident. So, therefore, we are dealing 
with an entity when they are talking about 
fibrositis that is not very clear and such 
sayings related to an accident is more 
abstract because it does not correlate 
with a lot of the things that one would 
expect from the accident. We don't see 
it, for instance, in everybody. That sort 
of thing. (R. 696, 697) 
In his brief, plaintiff claims Dr. Barbuto had only read 
one article on fibrositis anl that article accounted for the doc-
tor's expertise on the subject. This simply was not true as Dr. 
Barbuto's testimony made abundantly clear. (R. 691, 692, 695) 
Also, plaintiff claims that in formulating his opinions, 
Dr. Barbuto did not review other doctors' reports and medical 
records. This claim is false. Dr. Barbuto did review all 
available medical records on James Sanders after he examined him 
but before formulating his opinion. (R. 669) The doctor 
explained the reason he proceeded in this fashion was to enable 
him to be totally objective and to examine the patient without 
any preconceived notions. (R. 669) 
It is clear that Dr. Barbuto had the same access to 
medical reports and information as did Dr. Goka and yet Dr. 
Barbuto did not conclude that plaintiff sustained any injury in 
his accident of September 25, 1982. In fact, before he testified 
at trial, Dr. Barbuto reviewed all of Dr. Goka's records, the 
records from the St. Lukefs Pain Clinic, and Sanders1 test 
results. His opinion was unshaken. (R. 713) 
Plaintiff did not see Dr. Goka until more than a month 
and a half after he saw Dr. Barbuto. (R. 561) Dr. Goka never 
personally diagnosed a cervical strain since by his own testi-
mony, had Sanders sustained a cervical strain, its effects would 
have lasted only six to eight weeks. (R. 525) Dr. Goka asserted 
that plaintiff had fibrositis which was an outgrowth of an injury 
which plaintiff sustained in the September, 1982 accident. On 
cross-examination, however, Dr. Goka was forced to admit that 
records from St. Luke's contained references to Sanders 
sustaining whiplash injuries in two accidents prior to September 
25, 1982. (R. 592, 593) Dr. Goka did not know what medical 
treatment plaintiff may have received because of these accidents, 
and he never discussed the matter of these accidents with any 
personnel from St. Luke's. (R. 593) Plaintiff chose not to call 
any of the doctors at St. Luke's to testify. 
In his brief, plaintiff misstates Dr. Goka's testimony 
in numerous critical instances. For example, plaintiff asserts 
that Dr. Goka "made specific reference to the findings of two 
other doctors, Dr. Evans and Dr. Rich, both of whom saw plaintiff 
promptly after the accident and reported that plaintiff suffered 
a cervical strain in his collision with defendant." (Plaintiff's 
Brief, p. 11) This statement is simply untrue. Reports of Dr. 
Evans and Dr. Rich were not in evidence. These doctors did not 
testify. Moreover, Dr. Goka testified he did not see a report 
from Dr. Rich nor did he talk to Dr. Rich about his prognosis. 
(R. 582, 583) The only reference to Dr. Rich was in cross-
examination when defendant's counsel asked if it was true that 
Dr. Rich found "no neurological deficit." To reiterate, plain-
tiff's claim that Dr. Goka read from Dr. Rich's report and that 
this helped Dr. Goka formulate his opinion, is simply contrary to 
Dr. Goka's testimony. As noted, Dr. Goka was not aware of Dr. 
Rich's report and never spoke with him. (R. 583) 
Insofar as Dr. Evans is concerned, there is no evidence 
in the record as to what Dr. Evans' report consisted of. There 
is no evidence suggesting that Dr. Evans concluded that plaintiff 
was injured in the September 25, 1982 accident with plaintiff. 
In his testimony, Dr. Goka did say he reviewed a report from Dr. 
Barbuto and reviewed certain radiographic studies of plaintiff. 
(R. 527) However, Dr. Goka never explained how these matters 
assisted him in any way in formulating the opinions he reached 
since Dr. Barbuto concluded that there were no signs that plain-
tiff sustained any injury and since the radiographic studies of 
Sanders were normal. 
In his brief at page 9, plaintiff makes the incorrect 
statement that he suffered from tinnitis and that "independent 
testing performed by Dr. Nielsen, an ear specialist, stated that 
the tinnitis was a direct result of the subject automobile 
accident." There is no such evidence in the record and the record 
citations contained in plaintiff's brief are misplaced. Dr. 
Nielsen did not testify and no medical reports of his were 
admitted into evidence. (R. 550) In his testimony, Dr. Goka did 
allude to a report from Dr. Nielsen which suggested tinnitis was 
related to the accident, but it is clear that Dr. Nielsen did not 
see Sanders except on referral from Dr. Goka, and the only infor-
mation Dr. Nielsen, or Dr. Goka for that matter, had about the 
accident of September 25, 1982, was what plaintiff told them. 
Insofar as tinnitis is concerned, Dr. Goka admitted that his 
belief that plaintiff suffered from tinnitis was based upon sub-
jective, not objective, criteria. (R. 565-567) 
In his brief at page 8, plaintiff claims that "Dr. Goka 
testified that St. Luke's medical reports were submitted to him 
and that these confirmed that James Sanders had suffered a cer-
vical strain which in turn caused f ibrositis.,f In referring to 
those records, Dr. Goka's testimony was, "he [Sanders] had a 
flexion extension injury caused by a cervical strain, although he 
had fibrositis and also he was depressed." (R. 548) There is no 
evidence suggesting that the St. Luke's records ever implied a 
causal relationship between cervical strain and fibrositis. 
Moreover, the records from St. Luke's noted that plaintiff 
sustained cervical strain in two accidents prior to September 25, 
1982. (R. 592) 
Plaintiff contends that Dr. Goka was an expert in fibro-
sitis and yet neglects to inform the court that Dr. Goka, him-
self, testified fibrositis is a controversial diagnosis and many 
qualified physicians simply do not believe in it. (R. 558) 
Plaintiff contends that Dr. Goka referred him to the St. 
Luke's Pain Clinic in Phoeniz, Arizona. However, Dr. Goka 
admitted that plaintiff's counsel suggested that this referral be 
made and that plaintiff's counsel wrote him a letter which read 
in pertinent part as follows: 
It would help me if in your letter to St. 
Lukes you make it sufficiently strong, as 
a matter of medical necessity, dealing 
both with the injury, the resultant fibro-
sitis and the resultant depression that is 
all connected to the automobile accident 
of September 25, 1982 and is all necessary 
as a medical matter. (R. 589) 
On cross-examination, Dr. Goka admitted that when he 
first saw plaintiff on April 13, 1983, he reviewed plaintiff's x-
rays which were normal, plaintiff's myelogram results which were 
normal. (R. 81) He found no objective signs of tinnitis. (R. 
567) He read Dr. Barbuto's report and agreed that there were no 
neurological issues. (R. 568) Although he equivocated with 
fibrosities patients, he agreed with the concept of secondary 
gain and that the very idea of rewarding symptoms is a primary 
cause of the symptoms themself. (R. 576) He admitted during his 
treatment of plaintiff that plaintiff had a high anxiety level 
and he conceded that anxiety and stress can cause the manifesta-
tions of headaches, neck pain and shoulder pain (R. 584), and 
that pain can be psychogenic in origin caused by stresses, 
depression and other things totally unrelated to trauma. (R. 
586) Dr. Goka also admitted that the St. Luke's Pain Clinic 
administered a number of tests to plaintiff -- EEG, Cat scans, 
etc. -- and that the results of these tests were all negative and 
showed no abnormality of any kind, (R. 588) 
Dr. Spencer, a Board certified orthopedic surgeon, was 
the final witness who testified at trial. He examined plaintiff 
in March of 1984, and he reviewed all medical records pertaining 
to plaintiff. 
In his brief, plaintiff attempts to convince the Court 
that Dr. Spencer did not review the medical records pertaining to 
him because according to plaintiff, Dr. Spencer was not 
interested in the "inuendos and inferences" of treating physi-
cians. Plaintiff's attempted criticism of Dr. Spencer is wholly 
misplaced. On cross-examination, Dr. Spencer explained: 
Q. Another thing I want to clarify, as 
I understood your testimony at the start 
of your direct examination, you said that 
you thought you had all of these various 
reports that you have listed available in 
hand but that you examined Mr. Sanders and 
then went through them to see if they con-
firmed or disagreed with whatever was your 
diagnosis? 
A. What I try and do is try and be as 
objective as I can. So I don't get a bias 
built in from other examiners. But I also 
try and make sure I don't miss an area 
that has been brought out before that the 
patient either has forgotten about or 
doesn't want to bring it out. And so I 
review that, as I talked with him briefly, 
but I go into the analysis later. 
Q. Analysis of the other reports? 
A. Right. 
Q. If you wanted to have everything, 
these other sources could feed you. You 
would study them carefully before your 
examination so you couldn't miss anything 
in what they had? 
A. If I were interested in the innuen-
dos and the inferences and before the exa-
mination, then that would be the best way 
to do it, yes. 
Q. Essentially, you put them aside 
until you have completed your examination 
and then you work from them in detail? 
A. That is right. To make my diagno-
sis, I evaluate the patient's story he 
told. The physical examination and the 
record. (R. 774, 775) 
In his brief at page 16, plaintiff states, "Neither Dr. 
Barbuto nor Dr. Spencer made any claim or statement that plain-
tiff had not been injured as he claimed." This statement is not 
true. Dr. Barbuto's testimony is detailed above. Dr. Spencer's 
testimony is summarized below. Both doctors testified they saw 
no evidence of any injury. 
Dr. Spencer tested plaintiff's range of motion and found 
it to be normal. (R. 747, 748) Plaintiff had a normal grip pat-
tern, normal circumference of his two arms, normal Atkins test 
and normal sensation. (R. 748-750) 
Dr. Spencer noted that plaintiff said he had tenderness 
in several sites but that when the doctor palpated these areas 
with plaintiff distracted, there was no sign of tenderness. (R. 
750-752) Dr. Spencer also noted that plaintiff complained of 
decreased sensation in the forearm area but that this claim made 
no anatomical sense. (R. 751) Regarding these subjects, the 
doctor testified: 
Q. Did you do any pushing or palpata-
tion with Mr. Sanders distracted or doing 
something else? 
A. I did. I wanted to evaluate. See, 
pain is strictly a subjective situation 
and you have to rely entirely on the 
patient's response. 
Q. So you say when you are talking 
about these areas of tenderness that that 
was a subjective kind of a thing where you 
pressed and he said it hurts? 
A. That is right. So, I did repeat 
these tests when he was distracted and 
looking away and was responding to another 
request of mine and I didn't find that 
tenderness or complaints of pain when 
these areas were palpated. That is, he 
didn't respond or withdraw or didn't pull 
away to indicate that those areas were 
tender. 
Q. Was that significant to you? 
A. I felt it was significant. I felt 
that perhaps his pain was not an objective 
type of pain. 
Q. Now, did Mr. Sanders describe -- you 
say he described some decreased sensation? 
A. Yes, he stated there was a decreased 
sensation over the front part of his arm, 
forearm area, in the small end that 
included his thumb. And that is atypical 
for the way our bodies are put together. 
The nerves don't supply an area that isn't 
formed from the thumb clear on up into the 
arm. So this is impossible to explain on 
the basis of the anatomy of the body. (R. 
750, 751) 
Dr. Spencer testified that he saw no objective signs of 
any injury. He stated: 
I didn't find anything that I could 
measure by way of loss of motion, outside 
of the small perimeter that he was -- that 
was slightly different or reduced from 
normal. I didn't find any reproducible 
areas of tenderness when he was 
distracted. I think he does have areas of 
tenderness on exam when I would examine 
him directly, that was reproducible. (R. 
752) 
Dr. Spencer also observed that he reviewed the x-rays 
and myelogram of plaintiff. On these documents, he saw some evi-
dence of degenerative disc disease which was wholly unrelated to 
any kind of trauma which plaintiff may have experienced. (R. 
753, 754, 755) 
In explaining plaintiff's symptoms, Dr. Spencer 
testified they did not fit any objective pattern and were psycho-
genic in origin. (R. 756) Dr. Spencer also felt that degenera-
tive disc disease unrelated to the accident played a role in 
producing Sanders' perceived symptoms. The doctor testified: 
A. Well, I felt that his symptoms were 
possibly relating to pre-existing changes, 
degenerative changes that we talked about 
and probably some other reason that I 
couldn't objectively measure. I felt that 
the symptoms didn't fit objective pat-
terns. They were what we call 
"psychogenic in origin." 
Q. You better explain those terms. You 
said it didn't fit an objective pattern. 
What do you mean by that and then what do 
you mean "psychogenic in origin"? 
A. I always give the patient the bene-
fit of the doubt and try and find reasons 
for the pain. Particular injury, par-
ticular area of weakness, particular nerve 
that is involved. Something that is 
reproducible, that you can go back time 
and time again and find and I couldn't 
find those things. And so, if you don't 
find the objective reasons, arthritis, 
fracture, dislocation, then you have to 
assume there is some other cause and you 
have to look for a psychological ideology. 
The doctor further explained as follows: 
A. Well, I felt that there was probably 
an alternate reason for his symptoms 
appearing. We talked about the term 
"secondary gain.11 When you talk about 
psychological sources of pain, what that 
means is that there is a gain to the 
patient for having the symptoms, as 
bizarre as that sounds. The primary gain 
that a patient comes to you with is to 
have those symptoms alleviated. But if 
there isn't a primary gain, there often is 
secondary gain where the individual has 
symptoms which are maintained to receive 
some compensation of some type. Social, 
emotional, reassurance from family, relief 
from the stresses of his daily life, 
employment pressures that are on him, 
financial pressures, sometimes there are 
actual monetary gains. Usually these are 
in injury situations. You don't see them 
in people, as a rule, who are employed, 
who are earning an income, who are coping 
with life. Did I mix you up? 
Q. No. No. So, is this your conclu-
sion of the symptoms that Mr. Sanders was 
experiencing psychogenic pain and there 
was a secondary gain that was present 
there? 
A. I felt that -- I was chasing the 
diagram notice here. His symptoms were 
due to, one, a degenerative cervical and 
spine disc decrease. What that means, 
degenerative of the cervical and dorsal 
spine. 
Q. When we talk about degenerative 
changes, we think about changes that hap-
pen when a person gets older? 
A. That is right, with age or with 
earlier injury. And those are manifest by 
the narrowing of the disc, by the arthri-
tic changes that are shown. And then 
secondly, I felt there was an over-
reactive personality that fits this cate-
gory of the psychological or psychogenic 
type of pain. (R. 756-758) 
The doctor observed that intervening stresses, anxiety 
and tensions such as financial difficulties and marital problems 
probably played a key role in Sanders1 condition. (R. 759) 
Insofar as fibrositis is concerned, Dr. Spencer said he 
had treated a number of patients who had been diagnosed as having 
fibrositis. (R. 762) He described the fibrositis diagnosis as 
controversial and based strictly on subjective feelings. (R. 
761) He stated: 
It's a diagnosis that is reached by 
conclusion of any other disease process 
and there is not a way to measure what it 
means. And the feeling has been in some 
circles that this is kind of a waste 
basket diagnosis. (R. 761) 
Dr. Spencer was then asked if plaintiff had fibrositis. 
He responded as follows: 
A. Well, I concluded that he didn't. 
The reasons are these: 1, is he did not 
have a reproducible pain picture [sic] which 
distracted. Secondly, his pain was dif-
fuse and not localized to what are called 
"trigger points" in those who have written 
of this type of syndrome. And I felt, 
thirdly, that during the examination that 
there was a tendency toward over-
exaggeration. Most patients who have a 
problem will exaggerate to some extent to 
make sure it is recognized. I felt above 
and beyond that normal pattern there was a 
giving way of testing and overreactivity. 
Fourthly, there appeared to be an 
inappropriate attitude or emotion. He 
didn't have the typical concern about the 
problem that you would expect an indivi-
dual to have with an injury. (R. 761 , 
762) 
Dr. Spencer testified that the tinnitis to which plain-
tiff complained would not be caused by cervical strain. He said 
there are multiple causes of tinnitis but cervical strain is not 
one of them. (R. 53, 63) 
Dr. Spencer concluded that plaintiff suffered from no 
physical impairment (R. 763), that he could work full time and 
this would in fact be therapeutic for him (R. 764), that there 
was no reason for plaintiff to limit his activities or hobbies 
and that the only treatment plaintiff may need would possibly be 
psychiatric in nature. (R. 765, 766) The doctor concluded: 
A. I didn't find any objective reasons 
for his discomfort. I felt there was this 
over-exaggeration of his symptoms and he 
did have a difficult social background in 
the past and he fit the pattern for 
someone with an emotional psychogenic or 
emotional source of pain. (R. 765) 
Evidence was elicited -- much of which Sanders equivo-
cated about or denied, thereby seriously compromising his credi-
bility -- establishing that Sanders experienced numerous stresses 
in his life which the doctors testified could cause all of the 
symptoms of which Sanders complained. Within the space of a few 
years and before his accident with Ahlstrora, plaintiff had a 
hernia operation, back fusion, cancer, surgery resulting in the 
removal of a testicle, and over 50 radiation and chemotherpay 
treatments. (R. 488-490) Plaintiff admitted being involved in 
two prior and one subsequent accidents and said he was "scared as 
hell" to drive a car. (R. 471) Plaintiff's wife lost her job as 
a chemist in 1983, and plaintiff experienced marital difficulties 
and financial difficulties shortly after his accident. (R. 494-
497, 499, 618, 631) Plaintiff did not get along well with his 
employer, Farmers Insurance Company, and wanted to change jobs, 
(R. 631) He moved into a new neighborhood subsequent to the 
accident, (R. 472, 473) All of these pre-existing and inter-
vening stresses are the kinds of things the doctors testified 
could cause Sanders1 perceived symptoms of headaches, neck pain, 
shoulder pain and ringing of the ears. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Succinctly stated, plaintiff argues that there was no 
evidence suggesting he was not injured as a direct and proximate 
result of the September 25, 1982, automobile accident with 
Kristin Ahlstrom, and therefore the unanimous jury verdict was 
wrong. Plaintiff seeks to convince this court that reasonable 
people could never have concluded as did the jury unanimously in 
this case and, therefore, the verdict of the fact finders should 
be discarded. He also seeks to convince the court that the 
District Court Judge who weighed and considered the evidence 
abused his discretion when he denied plaintiff's motion for new 
trial. This argument is untenable for the following reasons, any 
one of which is sufficient to uphold the jury verdict and trial 
court judgment. 
The jury was entitled to discount or disbelieve plain-
tiff's testimony regarding his claimed injury. The burden of 
proof rested with plaintiff, and he failed to meet his burden. 
Credible evidence suggested that plaintiff was not injured in the 
September 25, 1982 accident. If the jury believed plaintiff was 
injured, credible evidence suggested that those injuries resulted 
from prior accidents, subsequent accidents, stress, anxiety, pre-
existing degenerative disc disease, or other causes unrelated to 
the September 25, 1982 accident. If injured at all in the 
September 25, 1982 accident, plaintiff recovered within a few 
days or at most, a few weeks. His medical expenses did not 
exceed $500, he had no permanent impairment or disability, and 
therefore no valid tort cause of action existed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
BURDEN OF PROOF AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW. 
In this case, there is no indication that the jury 
misunderstood or failed to take into account proven facts, misun-
derstood or disregarded the law or rendered a verdict without 
factual support in the evidence. On the contrary, the verdict is 
reasonable and was rendered after careful and thoughtful deli-
beration by an eight person jury. Similarly, Judge Russon denied 
the motion for new trial after the same careful and thoughtful 
deliberation. 
Proximate cause, like negligence, is peculiarly a factual 
question for the jury. Waters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455 (Utah 
1981); Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 611 
P.2d 363 (Utah 1980). Once a jury has served its function and 
"found the facts", these findings should be given every presump-
tion of validity and should be disturbed only if there is no 
basis in the evidence to support them. 
Plaintiff, of course, had the burden of proof. The jury 
unanimously found that he failed to meet that burden. The case 
of Gilhespie v. DgJong, 520 P.2d 878 (Utah 1974), speaks clearly 
to the burden of proof issue. In Gilhespie, a bicyclist brought 
an action for personal injuries he sustained when struck by an 
automobile driven by defendant. The jury found for defendant and 
the trial court entered judgment on the jury verdict. On appeal, 
plaintiff argued, "There is no substantial competent evidence to 
support the verdict of the jury.11 In affirming the trial court, 
this Court stated: 
It is to be observed that this proposition 
misplaces the burden of proof. That is, 
it seems to assume that there must be 
substantial evidence to support the jury's 
refusal to find for the plaintiff; 
whereas, the burden was upon the plaintiff 
to make the proof to justify a verdict for 
him; and if the jury were not so persuaded 
by a preponderance of the evidence, they 
were not obligated to render such a ver-
dict. 
The recent case of Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170 (Utah 
1983), is directly on point. In this case, plaintiff, a 
passenger in a dune buggy, brought a negligence action against 
the driver to recover damages plaintiff sustained when the dune 
buggy flipped over. The trial court judge entered judgment in 
favor of defendant on the jury's special verdict. He then denied 
plaintiff's motion for new trial. This Court affirmed on appeal. 
In discussing the role of the jury and the applicable standard on 
appeal, this Court stated: 
Moreover, it is the prerogative of the 
jury to believe one witness over another 
and to weigh the evidence. See Hindmarsh 
v. P.P. Skaggs Foodliner, 21 Utah 2d 413, 
446 P.2d 410 (1968) . On appeal we will 
review the juryfs verdict in a light most 
favorable to the prevailing party, Lamkin 
v. Lynch, Utah, 600 P.2d 530 (1979), and 
accord the evidence presented and every 
reasonable inference fairly to be drawn 
therefrom the same degree of deference. 
Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 
supra. Id. 172. 
In discussing the trial court's refusal to grant a new 
trial based upon plaintiff's allegation that the verdict was not 
supported by the evidence, this Court stated: 
The trial court has wide discretion 
to grant or deny a motion for a new trial 
and we do not reverse a denial unless the 
"evidence to support the verdict was 
completely lacking or was so slight and 
unconvincing as to make the verdict 
plainly unreasonable and unjust.11 
IdL 173. 
This Court then noted that as long as the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in failing to grant a motion for new trial, 
the Supreme Court "cannot interfere." J^ d. 173. 
Lee v. Howes, 548 P.2d 619 (Utah 1976), involved an 
action by a minor plaintiff for injuries she suffered when struck 
by defendant's automobile. The trial court entered judgment of 
no cause of action on a jury verdict and denied plaintiff's 
motion for new trial. This Court affirmed on appeal and in so 
doing stated: 
In addition to what is said about the 
prerogatives of the jury, there is the 
further proposition that the trial court 
reviewed this case and the arguments of 
counsel in connection with his decision to 
deny the motion for a new trial. This 
court has always recognized that the trial 
court has considerable latitude of discre-
tion in the granting or denying of a 
motion for a new trial in accordance with 
his judgment as to what the ends of 
justice require; and that his rulings 
thereon should not be overturned unless it 
appears that his action clearly 
transgressed reasonable bounds of 
discretion. 
This case falls within the ruling we 
have heretofore announced: that the pur-
pose of the trial is to afford the parties 
a full and fair opportunity to present 
their evidence and their contentions and 
to have the issues in dispute between them 
determined by a jury; and that when that 
has been accomplished we will not disturb 
the determination made by the jury and the 
trial court unless it is shown that there 
was substantial and prejudicial error 
which prevented a fair trial, or that there 
is no substantial basis in the evidence 
upon which reasonable minds could conclude 
as the jury did. JA. 621 . 
In his brief, plaintiff cites and then tries to 
distinguish the recent Utah decision of Christenson v. Shear, 
688 P.2d 467 (Utah 1984). Christenson was a case very similar to 
the instant case where the jury found that: 
. . . plaintiff's claimed injuries were 
not proximately caused by the defendant's 
negligence running into the rear end of 
her car at a traffic stop. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict and trial court 
judgment refusing to disturb the jury's findings on the proximate 
cause issue. 
In the present case, plaint i f f does not claim the jury 
was improperly instructed on the causation issues. Rather plain-
tiff simply says the jury wrongly decided the issue. However, as 
recent decisions of this Court attest, a jury verdict on a fac-
tual issue after proper instructions are given deserves great 
weight and deference. 
II. 
JURY WAS ENTITLED TO DISCOUNT OR 
DISBELIEVE SANDERS' TESTIMONY. 
The only basis the jury had to determine that plaintiff 
was injured in the September 25, 1982, accident was plaintiff's 
own self-serving testimony. Dr. Goka had no knowledge concerning 
the accident and the cause of plaintiff's alleged symptoms other 
than what Sanders related. 
In Instruction No. 4, an instruction to which plaintiff 
took no exception, the jury was told: 
You are the exclusive judges of the 
credibility of the witnesses and the 
weight or convincing force of their testi-
mony. In so judging, you can take into 
consideration any interest a witness may 
have in the lawsuit and any bias or pro-
bable motive, or lack thereof, to testify 
as they do, if any is shown. You may also 
consider the deportment of witnesses upon 
the witness stand, the reasonableness or 
lack thereof of their statements, their 
frankness or the want of it, their oppor-
tunity to know, their ability to 
understand, their capacity to remember, 
and whether any witness contradicted him-
self or herself, and then determine 
therefrom, in accordance with your honest 
convictions, what weight and credibility 
you should give to the testimony of each 
witness, measured by reason and common 
sense and the rules set forth in these 
instructions. 
If you believe a witness has wilfully 
testified falsely to any material matter 
in this case, you may disregard the whole 
of the testimony of such witness except as 
you find it to have been corroborated by 
other credible evidence, in which event 
you should then give it the weight to 
which you find it is entitled. (R. 231) 
See also Instructions 6, 7 and 10, to which plaintiff likewise 
took no exception. (R. 233, 234, 237) The instructions are 
attached as Appendix 4, 5, 6 and 7, respectively. These instruc-
tions admonish the jury as fact finders to resolve all conflicts 
in the evidence and to reject evidence and testimony of witnesses 
altogether if the jury felt there had been falsification or the 
reasons given for the testimony were unsound. 
Sanders, who certainly had a motive to pin all of his 
perceived problems on his September 25, 1982, automobile acci-
dent, gave testimony that was unreasonable and riddled with 
hyperbole, falsification and untruths. For example, Sanders 
testified as follows: 
Plaintiff claimed to have received more medical treatment 
which cost more money than was actually the case. For example, 
plaintiff testified that he reviewed all medical bills and back 
up documentation before submitting a proposed exhibit showing 
medical expenses of $13,156.65. (R. 469, 503, 504) These expen-
ses could not be proven and the exhibit was never received as 
evidence. (R. 740, 741) Therapy expenses with Elaine Lu are an 
example of the exaggeration of expenses. When confronted with 
the actual bills on cross-examination, plaintiff was forced to 
recant his prior testimony and admit that his therapy expenses 
were several hundred dollars less than what he had previously 
testified under oath. (R. 505-508) Finally, plaintiff's counsel 
reduced his claim for medical expenses to $10,000 to which defen-
dant's counsel stipulated with the following caveat: 
I do not stipulate and sharply contest 
that these charges, any of them are as a 
result of the accident and that the medi-
cal expenses were necessary. (R. 741) 
Plaintiff testified he never told Ahlstrom or anyone 
else that he experienced a "prior whiplash." (R. 511) This is 
completely contrary to the unequivocal testimony of Ahlstrom, the 
testimony given by Mrs. Ahlstrom!s son and mother, and is incon-
sistent with testimony given by the investigating officer. (R. 
651-653) 
Plaintiff was involved in a serious automobile accident in 
July of 1983, the effects of which he tried to downplay and dis-
count. (R. 491-493) However, the photographs of plaintiff's Fiat 
automobile involved in that accident obviously depicted the impact 
and force of the accident was much more severe than was the case in 
the accident of September, 1982. (See Exhibits 13-D - 20-D) 
Plaintiff exaggerated the impact speed, force of impact, 
and damage to his car resulting from the September, 1982 acci-
dent. (R. 354, 355) The photographs show that damage to the 
vehicles was minimal in this accident and the impact speed, given 
the fact that Sanders' car was knocked forward only a few feet, 
had to be very low. (Exhibits 2-P, 30-D) (David Lord testified 
that had the impact speed been 20 mph, Sanders1 car would have 
been knocked forward 30 feet and had the impact speed been but 15 
mph, Sanders1 car still would traveled ahead 18 feet). (R. 415, 
416) 
On the witness stand, plaintiff tried to give an account 
of the accident which would comport with Dave Lord's testimony, 
i.e., Sanders did not know the distance his car was knocked for-
ward at the time of the accident, the color of the traffic light, 
or whether cars in front of him had already started to move at 
the time of impact. (R. 429, 430, 511-514) The trouble with 
plaintiff's new account of the accident as was pointed out on 
cross-examination was that it was contrary to what Sanders said 
in his deposition. At his deposition he said he stopped within a 
car length, the light was red when the accident occurred, his car 
was knocked forward two or three feet and he came to a stop 
within half a car length of the car in front. (R. 511-514 and 
Deposition of James Sanders, pp. 24, 43, 44) 
Although he had separate files to review for each 
insurance policy he maintained, (R. 514) plaintiff in an apparant 
attempt to bolster his claim for loss of income testified that by 
June of 1984, his insurance policy count dropped to 213. (R. 
514, 515) But plaintiff's supervisor Hal Brostrum testified and 
produced records which were received as exhibits which clearly 
established that Sanders' policy count was 451 in June of 1984. 
(R. 610, Exhibit D-29) 
Sanders denied ever saying he did not want to return to 
work for Farmers, yet the evidence reveals this is precisely what 
he said to Carl Checka, a rehabilitation specialist who testified 
at trial and what he also said to personnel at the St. Luke's 
Pain Clinic. (R. 631) 
On direct examination, plaintiff testified his income 
had dropped off markedly since the accident (R. 454, 455, 462), 
yet on cross-examination he was forced to admit it had actually 
been greater since the accident. In fact, Sanders' net income 
figures from 1978 through 1983 were $745, $2,065, $2,083, $1,571, 
$2,267 and $3,462, respectively. The most income Sanders ever 
earned during this five-year period was 1983, the year following 
the accident. (R. 517, Exhibits 13, 21-25) Yet, Sanders tried 
to convince the court and jury that he sustained a significant 
loss of income. 
The symptoms of which plaintiff complained were unreal. 
Dr. Spencer testified that when he conducted his examination, 
Sanders complained of several tender or trigger sites but that 
when Dr. Spencer palpatated Sanders with Sanders distracted the 
areas were not tender. (R. 750-752) 
Sanders exaggerated or falsified his symptoms. Despite 
all of Sanders1 protests, medical persons found no objective 
signs of any injury. (See generally testimony of Dr. Barbuto 
and Dr. Spencer) 
One of the intervening stresses which could have caused 
Sanders1 perceived problems was financial difficulties. On the 
witness stand, Sanders tried to skirt around this by saying his 
wife lost her job before the September 1982 accident. However, 
Sanders was forced to admit on cross-examination, the tax returns 
clearly show Mrs. Sanders lost her job in 1983 after the accident 
and not 1982, before the accident. (R. 496, 497) 
The foregoing are merely illustrative. But as noted, 
plaintiffs' testimony was riddled with inconsistency, exaggera-
tion, and falsification. The jury as a group of reasonable 
people would have been fully justified in disregarding Sanders1 
testimon}^ entirely and concluding that the various symptoms of 
which he complained were not real or had nothing to do with the 
minor, fender-bender automobile accident in which he was 
involved on September 25, 1982. 
III. 
ABUNDANT EVIDENCE SUGGESTS SANDERS WAS NOT 
INJURED IN THE SEPTEMBER 25, 1982 
ACCIDENT. 
Dr. Barbuto saw and tested Sanders in February of 1983. 
Dr. Barbuto testified that at that time -- just a few months 
after the accident — Sanders was not disabled or impaired in any 
way, there were no objective signs of injury, and the symptoms of 
which Sanders complained had nothing whatsoever to do with his 
prior automobile accident, but rather were probably a result of 
unrelated stress and tension or secondary gain. (R. 660-697, 
713) From Dr. Barbutofs testimony alone, the jury could reaso-
nably infer Sanders was not injured in the accident of September 
25, 1982. 
Dr. Spencer saw and tested Sanders in March of 1984. 
He likewise concluded that Sanders1 was not disabled or physi-
cally impaired, there were no objective signs of any injury and 
that Sanders1 "symptoms" must result from some cause other than 
the September 1982 accident. Dr. Spencer thought there were 
several explanations for Sanders1 subjective complaints, not the 
least of which were pre-existing psycological problems, inter-
vening traumatic events, and a very real secondary gain phenome-
non caused not by the accident but by the lawsuit. Dr. Spencer 
testified there was no reason Sanders should restrict or limit 
his activities in any way. (R. 743-766) Once again, from this 
testimony alone, the jury could certainly conclude Sanders 
sustained no injury on September 15, 1982. 
Neither from their examination of Sanders or their 
review of the medical records did Dr. Spencer or Dr. Barbuto 
observe any objective signs of injury to Sanders. X-rays were 
normal, orthopedic and neurologic tests were normal, CAT-scans 
were normal, other tests were normal. On the basis of all of 
this evidence plus the minor impact speed of the automobiles, 
Sanders activities after the accident (going to lunch with his 
family), and Sanders1 own lack of credibility, a jury could cer-
tainly have concluded that Sanders was not injured at all in the 
accident. 
In an attempt to bolster his claim that he sustained 
injury in the September 25, 1982 accident, plaintiff makes state-
ments in his brief which simply are not true. Many of these 
statements have been discussed above in the Statement of Facts. 
However, some additional discussion is warranted here. In his 
brief at page 24, plaintiff states, "He felt immediate back and 
neck pain when defendant's car struck his car. Plaintiff's wife 
confirmed this." This statement is a misrepresentation of the 
record. Mrs. Sanders' testimony is contained at pages 615-620 of 
the record. She was not asked a single question about this sub-
ject matter. 
In his brief at page 25, plaintiff claims that Dr. 
Gordon Evans diagnosed him as having suffered a cervical strain 
in the collision. Plaintiff relies on pages 526 and 527 of the 
record to support this claim. Plaintiff's claim is false since 
there is no evidence in the record of Dr. Evans' diagnosis. 
Plaintiff claims that Dr. Rich confirmed Dr. Evans' diagnosis and 
cites pages 582 and 583 of the record in support of this claim. 
Once again, the record is devoid of support for plaintiff's 
claim. 
At page 29 of his brief, plaintiff makes the very 
interesting assertion that neither of defendant's doctors are in 
a position to say that plaintiff had not sustained a cervical 
strain in the September 25, 1982 accident because they examined 
him for the first time long after the three to 12 week healing 
period for the cervical strain had run. The inconsistency of 
plaintiff's position is obvious. On the one hand, plaintiff 
claims that Dr. Barbuto's testimony should have been discounted 
by the jury and yet on the other hand, claims the jury should 
have readily endorsed Dr. Goka's testimony even though Dr. Goka 
did not first see plaintiff until a month and a half after Dr. 
Barbuto did. 
On page 33 of his brief, plaintiff states: "The nega-
tive evidence given by Drs. Barbuto and Spencer that they did not 
see evidence of the original injury when they examined plaintiff 
is not sufficient to overcome the positive evidence of Drs. Evans 
and Rich.11 Once again, this position is curious since Drs. Evans 
and Rich gave no evidence and no medical reports from them were 
introduced into evidence. Plaintiff's position is also curious 
since both Dr. Barbuto and Dr. Spencer testified at trial, gave 
their opinions that they saw no signs or evidence of injury and 
yet both of these doctors reviewed the medical records on plain-
tiff including reports by Dr. Evans and Dr. Rich and Dr. Barbuto 
even spoke orally with Dr. Rich whereas Dr. Goka did not review 
any reports from Dr. Rich and never spoke with him. 
IV. 
SUBSTANTIAL AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE SUGGESTS 
SANDERS' INJURIES, IF ANY, RESULTED FROM 
PRIOR ACCIDENTS, SUBSEQUENT ACCIDENTS, 
STRESS, ANXIETY, OR OTHER CAUSES UNRELATED 
TO THE SEPTEMBER 25, 1982 ACCIDENT. 
There was substantial and credible evidence suggesting 
that Sanders1 injuries, if any, occurred prior to the accident in 
question. Plaintiff had indeed sustained a prior whiplash. He 
told Kristin Ahlstrom this and she contemporaneously related what 
he had said to her son and mother. (R. 651-653, 725) 
Additionally, plaintiff was questioned about medical records from 
St. Lukes1 which he admitted having reviewed. (R. 729) There 
was reference in these records to whiplash injuries from two 
rear-end automobile accidents, both of which predated the 
September 25, 1982 accident. (R. 592) Also, Sanders himself 
admitted having a sore back and neck after one of the earlier 
accidents. (R. 435, 436) Additionally, Sanders said he had seen 
Burt Kidman, the physical therapist and chiropractor several 
times in the past for kinks in his back. Sanders refused to be 
more specific. (R. 485, 486) Interestingly, although Kidman was 
the first medical person seen by James Sanders after his 
September 25, 1982, accident, plaintiff chose not to call Kidman 
as a witness. Additionally, unrebutted testimony established 
Sanders1 had previously experienced an operation where disks in 
his lower back were fused together. (R. 488) This certainly 
suggests serious prior back problems. In his brief plaintiff 
makes the unfounded accusation that defendant's insurance company 
represented the two drivers involved in Sanders' prior accidents. 
This claim is incorrect, false and improper. Defendant's insurer 
had no record of either accident and of course plaintiff refused 
to provide the names of other drivers or the dates of the acci-
dents. (R. 510, 511) 
As noted above, plaintiff was involved in an accident on 
July 3, 1983. Evidence was introduced showing the impact speed 
was high and damage to the vehicles significant. (Exhibits 
13-D-20-D) Plaintiff's counsel himself introduced evidence 
suggesting that Sanders was injured as a result of this July, 
1983 accident. 
Medical experts testified that stress and tension can 
cause physical problems -- tension headaches, ulcers, head and 
shoulder pain, fibrocitis -- and in their opinion, stresses and 
tensions played a significant role in Sanders1 situation. (R. 
670-676, 759) Abundant evidence established that Sanders was 
under a lot of stress and tension, and, as established by Dr. 
Barbuto and Dr. Spencer, there was really no nexus between these 
stresses and tensions and Sanders1 September, 1982 accident. (R. 
686-688, 759, 765) Sanders1 stresses included the following: As 
noted, he had problems with work and did not desire to continue 
working for Farmer's Insurance Company. He experienced marital 
difficulties. He endured a serious bout with cancer resulting in 
the removal of a testicle and over 50 radiation treatments. He 
performed poorly at his job and experienced resultant financial 
difficulties which were exacerbated when his wife, a chemist, 
lost her job. He moved into a new home and strange neighborhood. 
He had serious pre-existing psychological problems so much so 
that Dr. Spencer testified that no future treatment except 
psychological counseling would be of any assistance to him. (R. 
765) 
Evidence established that secondary gain is a very real 
phenomenon and both Dr. Spencer and Dr. Barbuto thought it, not 
Sanders1 September, 1982 accident, was a major cause of Sanders1 
perceived symptoms. (R. 677-684, 757) 
V. 
IF INJURED AT ALL, SANDERS RAPIDLY 
RECOVERED AND HAD NO TORT CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Testimony from all doctors, including Dr. Goka, was uni-
form. The doctors stated that a cervical strain normally heals 
completely within a few days, or at most, a few weeks -- Dr. 
Barbuto "a few days" (R. 672); Dr. Goka "six to eight weeks" (R. 
525). 
In light of the clear medical testimony, it is reason-
able to conclude that Sanders was not injured in the September 
25, 1982 accident or that if he did suffer a neck strain, the 
strain healed completely within a couple of weeks, causing no 
disability or impairment whatsoever. If it is assumed, arguendo, 
that Sanders did sustain such a neck strain which healed within 
the time period all of the doctors said it would, it is clear 
that Sanders1 "injury" resulting from the accident never exceeded 
the no-fault threshold prescribed by §31-41-9, Utah Code 
Annotated, (1954 as amended). 
No evidence was submitted regarding exactly what medical 
expenses were incurred by plaintiff, when they were incurred, or 
if any of the medical expenses were necessary. Dr. Goka testi-
fied about future medical expenses, not past expenses. No one 
from any health care providers testified. Plaintiff was not 
qualified to testify whether medical expenses he incurred were 
necessary or not and indeed, he did not do so. On cross-
examination, plaintiff finally admitted he did not know what 
expenses were incurred or when they were incurred. (R. 443, 
505-508) Dr. Spencer and Dr. Barbuto testified there was nothing 
physically wrong with plaintiff, that he was not disabled and 
that a cervical strain heals itself in very short order. On the 
basis of this testimony, the jury could certainly have inferred 
that any medical expenses which plaintiff incurred were not 
necessary even assuming plaintiff had sustained a cervical strain 
in the injury of September 25, 1982. 
In short, there is no evidence that Sanders1 medical 
expenses during the period of time it would take his claimed cer-
vical strain to heal came close to $500, or that any medical 
expenses were necessary to facilitate the healing process. 
Moreover, the record is clear that from the testimony of Dr. 
Barbuto and Dr. Spencer that Sanders did not sustain any per-
manent impairment or disability. Therefore, Sanders simply had 
no valid cause of action and the jury verdict should and could be 
sustained on this basis. 
CONCLUSION 
On several bases the evidence clearly supports, 
sustains and upholds the jury's unanimous answer to Special 
Interrogatory No. 3 which reads: 
Did James Lee Sanders prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that his injuries, 
if any, were proximately caused by the 
accident in question? 
Answer: No. 
The jury was charged with the duty of finding the facts, 
resolving conflicts in evidence, and believing the testimony they 
thought was credible. The jury did precisely that, and its ver-
dict should not be ignored. 
It should be noted that plaintiff's counsel did not and 
does not now object to the form of the Special Verdict which was 
given to the jury. He merely argues that the jury was comprised 
of eight persons, not one of whom reasonably could have concluded 
as he or she each did, and that the trial judge who heard and 
weighed the evidence, abused his discretion when he denied the 
motion for new trial. 
For the reasons specified, the jury verdict should be 
upheld and the judgment of the trial court affirmed in all 
respects. 
Dated this j " day of May, 1985. 
STR0rfd& HANNI, 
.. Burton 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES LEE SANDERS, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. 
KRISTIN S. AHLSTROM, ] 
Defendant. ) 
> SPECIAL VERDICT 
i Civil No. C-83-692 
) Honorable Leonard Russon 
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY: 
At the end of each question submitted to you, indicate 
whether you adopt it as your verdict by answering "Yes" or "No". 
You can answer "Yes" only if there is a preponderance of the evi-
dence concerning the question. 
In the event you cannot find an answer "Yes", and by a 
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find the same "No". 
It requires the concurrence and agreement of at least 
six jurors to answer a question, and when six or more jurors 
agree upon an answer you should have the foreperson write in the 
answer and proceed to the next proposition. 
When you have answered all propositions that require an 
answer, the foreperson should then sign and date the verdict and 
return it to the courtroom. 
We the jury, duly impaneled in the above-entitled case, 
find the following answers to the interrogatories listed below: 
1. Did the plaintiff, James Lee Sanders, prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, Kristin S. 
Ahlstrom, was negligent. 
ANSWER: ^es 
2. If you answered question 1 "Yes", then answer this 
question: Did James Lee Sanders prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that such negligence on the part of Kristin S. Ahlstrom 
was a proximate cause of the accident? 
ANSWER: fa 
3. If you answered questions 1 and 2 "Yes", then answer 
this question: Did James Lee Sanders prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that his injuries, if any, were proximately caused 
by the accident in question^ 
ANSWER: / / & . 
4. If you answered questions 1, 2 and 3 "Yes", then 
answer this question: What amount of money, if any, did plain-
tiff prove by a preponderance of the evidence he is entitled to 
recover from defendant? 
Medical Expenses to date $ 
Loss of Earnings to date $ 
General Damages $ 
TOTAL $ 
Dated t h i s 30 day of /TUtf , 1984. 
F(preman o r / f y r e l a d y 
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ROBERT A. BURTON, #0516' 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sixth Floor Boston Build 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 
Telephone: 532-7080 
FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE 
Salt Lake Ccunty, Utah 
OCT 1 5 1984 
H DixorkHinGito. Clerk org Dist Cr-t" 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
8
™
TB 0F
_
UTAH
 JB/. /?/
 V Q . 3*7*, 
JAMES LEE SANDERS, et al., ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
KRISTIN S. AHLSTROM, ) 
Defendant. ) 
JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT 
Civil No. C83-692 
Honorable Leonard Russon 
The complaint of James Lee Sanders came on for trial 
before the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, one of the judges of 
the above-entitled court, sitting with a jury, on August 2 8, 
1984. Plaintiff, James Lee Sanders, was represented by his 
attorney, Samuel King. Defendant, Kristin S. Ahlstrom, was 
represented by her attorney, Robert A. Burton. At the close of 
the evidence, the case was submitted to the jury on a Special 
Verdict. The jury answered the special interrogatories as 
follows: 
1. Did the plaintiff, James Lee Sanders, prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, 
Kristin S. Ahlstrom, was negligent. 
ANSWER: Yes 
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2. If you answered question 1 "Yes", then answer this 
question: Did James Lee Sanders prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that such negligence on the part of 
Kristin S. Ahlstrom was a proximate cause of the 
accident? 
ANSWER: Yes 
3. If you answered questions 1 and 2 "Yes", then 
answer this question: Did James Lee Sanders prove by 
a preponderance of the evidence that his injuries, if 
any, were proximately caused by the accident in question? 
ANSWER: No 
4. If you answered questions 1, 2 and 3 "Yes", then 
answer this question: What amount of money, if any, 
did plaintiff prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
he is entitled to recover from defendant? 
Medical Expenses to date $ 
Loss of Earnings to date $ 
General Damages $ 
TOTAL $ 
/s/ Rick L. Jeppesen 
Foreperson 
NOW, THEREFORE, in accordance with the jury's answers to 
the special interrogatories as set forth above, the court orders 
and directs judgment in favor of defendant, Kristin S. Ahlstrom, 
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and against plaintiff, James Lee Sanders, no cause of action, 
and awards defendant Ahlstrom costs of court incurred herein. 
Dated this / ^ 5 d a y of odpLumi^ .'rv 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
Leonard H. Russetf,* Judge 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HiN'O'-L'Y 
CiCCK 
Deputy 15iu. * B y
 — ~ i 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
PATSY WYATT, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of Strong & Hanni, Attorneys 
for Defendant 
herein; that she served the attached 
u p o n p l a i n t i f f ' s counsel 
proposed JiKlgment on Special Verdict 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Samuel King 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
301 Gump & Ayers Bldg. 
2120 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid thereon, 
in*-
in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on the^a^fe day of 01 
. 198 4. 
to before me this 12th day of Subscribed and sworn September 
198 4 
7
^ N o t a r y Public Notary i 
My commission expires: Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
5/13/85 
APPENDIX 3 
ROBERT A. BURTON, #0516 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-7080 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Sal! Lake Ccunty. Utah 
OCT 22 1984 
H Dixcn Hir£!ev. C'c 
By Z&l ' 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES LEE SANDERS, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KRISTIN S. AHLSTROM, 
Defendant . 
O R D E R 
Civil No. C83-692 
Honorable Leonard Russon 
Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial or Modification of Verdict 
came on for hearing before the Honorable Leonard Russon, one of 
the judges of the above-entitled court, on October 15, 1984. 
Plaintiff was represented by his attorney, Samuel King, and 
defendant was represented by her attorney, Robert Burton. The 
court having reviewed the memoranda, listened to oral argument, 
being fully advised, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff's 
Motion for New Trial or Modification of Verdict be and hereby 
is denied. 
Dated this £}_ 
BY THE COURT: 
s day of October, 1984. 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HW r -l • CSi-u 
- ) >iA
 {/ n ^ U i ^ ^ £*fi6onard Russon<^Juc%e 
JS-^r^ayiJ' sca*i£nr\ 
r-e-fi *; 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
PATSY WYATT, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of Strong & Hanni, Attorneys 
for Defendant 
herein; that she served the attached Order 
upon P l a i n t i f f ' s counsel 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Samuel King 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
301 Gymp & Ayers Building 
2120 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid thereon, 
in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on the T 7^^ day of 
October , 198 4. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this I7th day of October 
198 4. 
/ Notarv Public t ry lic 
My commission expires: Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
5/13/85 316 
APPENDIX 4 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the 
witnesses and the weight or convincing force of their testimony. 
In so judging, you can take into consideration any interest a 
witness may have in the lawsuit and any bias or probable motive, 
or lack thereof, to testify as they do, if any is shown. You 
may also consider the deportment of witnesses upon the witness 
stand, the reasonableness or lack thereof of their statements, 
their frankness or the want of it, their opportunity to know, 
their ability to understand, their capacity to remember, and 
whether any witness contradicted himself or herself, and then 
determine therefrom, in accordance with your honest convictions, 
what weight and credibility you should give to the testimony of 
each witness, measured by reason and common sense and the rules 
set forth in these instructions. 
If you believe a witness has wilfully testified falsely 
to any material matter in this case, you may disregard the whole 
of the testimony of such witness except as you find it to have 
been corroborated by other credible evidence, in which event you 
should then give it the weight to which you find it is entitled. 
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APPENDIX 5 
INSTRUCTION NO. (P 
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the 
opinion of a witness to be received as evidence. An exception to 
this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses• A person who 
by education, study and experience has become an expert in any 
art, science or profession, and who is called as a witness, may 
give his opinion as to any such matter in which he is versed and 
which is material to the case. You should consider such expert 
opinion and should weigh the reasons, if any, given for it. You 
are not bound, however, by such an opinion. Give it the weight 
to which you deem it entitled, whether that be great or slight, 
and you may reject it, if in your judgment the reasons given for 
it are unsound. 
APPENDIX 6 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
As jurors, it is your exclusive responsibility to deter-
mine the issues of fact in this case, and you are to decide 
those issues from the evidence received in the trial and not 
from speculation or conjecture. 
The evidence to be considered by you includes the testi-
mony of witnesses, exhibits received by the court, stipulations 
of the parties, if any, reasonable inferences to be drawn from 
facts proven in the case, presumptions, if any, as are stated in 
these instructions, and all of the facts and circumstances dis-
closed thereby. 
If and where there is a conflict in the evidence, you 
should reconcile such conflict as far as you reasonably can; but 
where the conflict cannot be reconciled then, since you are the 
final judges of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses, 
you must resolve that conflict and determine from the evidence 
what you believe the true facts to be. 
Statements of counsel made throught the trial are not evi-
dence and should not be considered as such by you. 
APPENDIX 7 
INSTRUCTION NO. (^ 
If you believe any witness or any party has wilfully 
testified falsely as to any material matter, you may disregard 
the entire testimony of such witness or party, except as he may 
have been corroborated by other credible evidence. 
